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In the last decade or so, new literature on the biology and psychology 
of religion has accumulated. Some popular treatments of this literature 
have already been published: Pascal Boyer’s Religion Explained (2001), 
Justin Barrett’s Why Would Anyone Believe in God? (2004) and Robert 
McCauley’s Why Religion is Natural and Science is Not (2011), to name 
just a few. Born Believers (henceforth, BB) by psychologist Justin Barrett 
is a new addition to this literature. In the book, Barrett, while bracketing 
the evolutionary issues and some of the cognitive ones as well (such as 
ritual and practice), focuses on the development of religious belief in 
childhood. His argument is, simply, that children are in fact naturally 
prone to adopt religious beliefs. In addition, he wants to fend off 
suspicions that his conclusion might produce in the minds of religious 
sceptics and maintains that religious belief is not ‘childish’.
To be sure, BB is targeted at a popular audience, so the reader should 
not expect detailed descriptions of research methods or too much 
theoretical background or philosophical reflection. The tone of the 
book is light and the text is peppered with amusing (and sometimes 
less amusing) stories. However, for those of us who are not too keen 
to trudge through great amounts of psychological research articles and 
reports, Barrett’s short summaries of various experiments are useful and 
there is enough depth to the description of studies. Actually, one of the 
most interesting aspects of the book are the numerous descriptions of the 
ingenious experimental designs that developmental psychologists have 
devised to understand the beliefs and mental lives of young children and 
even babies.
The main thesis of BB is that ‘children are prone to believe in 
supernatural beings such as spirits, ghosts, angels, devils, and gods 
during the first four years of life due to ordinary cognitive development in 
ordinary human environments’ (p. 3). Barrett also makes the somewhat 
more controversial suggestion that children might have a bias towards 
more specifically Judeo-Christian-type god-concepts. Indeed, ‘evidence 
exists that children find especially natural the idea of a  nonhuman 
creator of the natural world, possessing superpower, super knowledge, 
and super perception, and being immortal and morally good’ (p. 3).
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In order to understand BB’s basic argument better, it is useful to 
briefly examine what Barrett means by ‘natural’ in this context. Often 
naturalness is associated with something being innate or hard-wired, 
but this is not what Barrett means by it. Instead what is being referred 
to are actions characterized by cognitive ease and automaticity. Robert 
McCauley has made a useful distinction between practiced naturalness 
and maturational naturalness. Maturationally natural capacities emerge 
normally in human development and are mostly independent of specific 
cultural influence. Learning to walk and speak one’s native language 
are the most typical examples of maturational naturalness. Whereas 
maturationally natural capacities require no special instruction, training, 
artefacts or tools, there are capacities that require exactly these. McCauley 
holds that capacities like reading, effortlessly driving a car or doing basic 
algebra are natural in the latter (practiced) sense: they require specialist 
instruction, training and tools.
Given these distinctions, BB’s argument is that certain kinds of 
religious beliefs are maturationally natural to children, that is, children 
tend to adopt certain kinds of beliefs given that they are reared in a normal 
environment and have normal biological makeup. This does not result 
into any kind of biological determinism, because maturationally natural 
capacities are not necessarily determined by our biology. As Barrett puts 
it, ‘just because we have a biological disposition towards a trait does not 
mean it will develop without the right kind of environment, and just 
because something is not built in does not mean that it is not nearly 
inevitable as a part of human development’ (p. 19).
Now, BB consists of two parts. In the first part, Barrett goes through 
various developmental studies to support his argument, and in the 
second he considers some of the implications of his argument.
He first reviews evidence that suggests children finding and positing 
agents easy and natural. With early-developing capacities, like agency 
detection and theory of mind, thinking about invisible agents and their 
special powers is cognitively easy for children, which in turn makes it 
likely that they will adopt god-concepts, if they are around. He then 
describes several studies (some of his own) on how god-concepts that 
include superknowledge and immortality might be natural for children 
to understand.
Barrett pits some of his conclusions against the received view of the 
religious development of children, that of the developmentalist Jean 
Piaget. According to Piaget, children anthropomorphize God, that 
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is, they think about God as if God were just like another human (like 
their parents in most ways). Only when capacities for abstract reasoning 
develop around eight or nine years of age do they begin to distinguish 
between God and humans. Barrett argues that Piaget got something the 
wrong way around. It is not the case that children learn to think about 
God by extrapolating on the basis of their parents, but instead children 
before the age of four tend to think that all agents are like God, super 
knowing, immortal and super powerful. So the more sophisticated 
children’s reasoning gets, the more children learn to restrict their 
intuitions and understand, for example, that not all people know what 
they themselves know and that biological life has an  end point. So, 
instead of anthropomorphizing God and gods, children might actually 
make their parents and other agents god-like.
One of the main points in the first part is that the common assumption 
of children simply soaking up whatever their parents teach them is 
wrong. Against this (what Barrett calls the) Indoctrination hypothesis, 
Barrett defends the Preparedness hypothesis, namely, that children have 
a natural cognitive tendency to adopt religious-type concepts and not 
just any religious-type concepts but specific kinds of god-concepts. In 
other words, children do not learn everything that their parents teach 
them with similar ease, but instead some ideas make more sense to them 
than others.
For instance, Barrett argues that because teleological and design 
thinking is so intuitive for children (and adults too), teaching children 
evolution is rather hard. Children have the tendency to assume several 
things that make understanding evolution difficult. First of all, they 
assume that there is inherent teleology in nature. This is shown by series 
of ingenuous experiments conducted by Deborah Kelemen, among 
others, that suggests children (and adults) prefer functional explanations 
for natural kinds and substances. Second, children also tend to think 
that there is a link between agents and order: order does not come about 
all by itself but is a product of intentional agency. Third, children also 
have a  strong intuition that natural kinds and entities are not human 
made: children can readily distinguish between artefacts (human made) 
and natural entities (designed but not human made). These tendencies 
give rise to a kind of ‘intelligent design’ bias, that is, a tendency to see 
nature and especially animals as designed for some purpose. Having 
this tendency makes it rather counterintuitive to believe that the natural 
world is a product of biological evolution, which is not driven by any 
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agent or does not operate with a goal in mind. Thus, even in cases where 
children have grown up in an environment where evolution is explicitly 
taught and supernatural belief actively discouraged, children have 
trouble understanding and believing evolution and favour agent and 
designer type explanation over standard biological ones.
The second part of the book deals with some of the implications of 
the naturalness of religious belief hypothesis. Barrett begins the part by 
rarefying the main point: not all god-beliefs are maturationally natural, 
but only certain basic ones. The core ‘natural religion’ includes the belief 
in some sort of creating and super powerful god and design in nature but 
it does not, for example, entail strict monotheism. Furthermore, at least 
some of the attributes of orthodox monotheistic gods are not supported 
by maturationally natural cognition, but are, in fact, contrary to it. For 
example, the Trinitarian view of God and the notion of God being 
outside time and space are rather unnatural and, thus, more difficult for 
both adults and children to believe. Here we encounter some interesting 
studies about what Barrett calls the ‘theological incorrectness effect’. 
Some theologically correct attributes of God, like omnipresence and 
‘omniattention’ seem difficult for people to process in situations where 
reflection is not especially encouraged. Several studies revealed that 
although religious believers verbally profess that God is everywhere and 
can do all things at the same time, they nevertheless made systematic 
distortions to stories about God’s actions and presence. They tended 
to ‘anthropomorphize’ God in ways that made God more like normal 
agents, such as being able to direct attention to only to one place instead 
of some other or being in one place rather than another. The theological 
incorrectness effect, thus, reveals the difference between natural 
religion and theologies. Natural religion, according to Barrett, provides 
an  anchor-point or the basic building blocks for religious elaboration 
and actual theologies.
Some critics of religion, such as Richard Dawkins, have famously 
argued that teaching religion to children is a  form of child abuse. 
Given what Barrett has said so far, it is not difficult to figure out that he 
disagrees. Although he acknowledges that religious education can be in 
some extreme cases abusive (as all education), there is nothing abusive 
in teaching children what their parents genuinely believe and practice. 
This applies to both religion and non-religion. Barrett then makes 
a pragmatic argument for this. Because children have a natural tendency 
to seek role models and wanting to become like their parents, if parents 
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do not teach their children what they themselves believe and profess, 
the children will naturally feel excluded. Behind the worry of Dawkins 
and others is the view that children are blank slates and learn anything 
that their parents teach them. But if the research that BB presents is 
correct, this assumption is false. The reason why most children adopt 
the religious beliefs of their parents is not that their parents and their 
religious communities indoctrinate, bully or abuse them to believe, but 
simply because it is easy for children to adopt religious ideas, if they are 
around.
Finally, I want to briefly discuss one philosophically salient topic in 
BB. Given BB’s basic claim, the natural question to ask is whether the fact 
that we do indeed have some maturationally natural capacities that make 
the emergence of certain kinds of god-beliefs likely provide problems 
for the truth or justification of religious beliefs. More specifically, 
the philosopher of religion is interested in whether psychological 
explanations of religious beliefs will have any significant impact in the 
philosophical debates about atheism and theism.
This question is pressing, because naturalistic explanations of religion 
are often used as parts of critiques of religion. It also looks at least 
intuitively plausible that if we can explain the emergence of a belief in 
such a way that the explanation makes no reference to the truth of the 
belief, the belief itself is undermined. In other words, if we can explain 
how god-beliefs come about without making references to gods or such, 
god-beliefs must be false or unjustified. In the first case, the argument 
would be that the fact of naturalistic causal explanation for religious 
belief gives us a  reason to think that religious beliefs are false. The 
problem, however, is that such an argument would commit the genetic 
fallacy. There is no logical contradiction between the statements ‘religion 
is completely naturally caused’ and ‘God exists’, so we should not infer 
straightforwardly from a naturalistic explanation of religion to the falsity 
of religious belief. As to the justification of religious beliefs, things are 
more complicated. It seems at least intuitively plausible to think that 
if I  learn that the causes of my god-belief is purely natural, this would 
constitute a defeater for my belief and I would not be any longer justified 
in believing in God.
Apart from assuring that the BB account does not by itself debunk 
religious belief, Barrett does not really deal with these issues. There are 
a  few hints towards an  answer to the justification problem, though. 
Barrett points out that many trustworthy beliefs that adults have 
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(e.g., permanence of solid objects, other people have minds, gravity) are 
based on maturationally natural cognition. From this a general rule is 
derived: ‘our minds as basically trustworthy to deliver true beliefs and ... 
our naturally arising “childish” beliefs should be regarded as true until 
we have good reason to suspect them as being problematic’ (p.  173). 
More philosophically put, deliverances of our cognitive faculties in their 
proper conditions are prima facie justified and since religious belief 
is a  product of such faculties, it should be considered as prima facie 
justified. Here we have a kind of Reidian (after Thomas Reid) answer to 
the justification problem.
There are some worries here, though. First, might there be something 
in the BB account itself which functions as defeaters for the prima facie 
justification. One could, for instance, argue that a benevolent and all-
powerful God would be unlikely to use such fallible mechanisms as 
hair-triggered agency detection to provide people with beliefs about 
God. There might be some divine hiddenness-type worries about the 
goodness and trustworthiness of God. Nevertheless, some (including 
Barrett himself in his other works) have argued that the Christian God 
would most likely create natural psychological mechanisms that would 
favour at least some kind of belief in God. Reformed theologians often 
talk of sensus divinitatis as fulfilling such a role. If this were plausible, 
the BB account of religious beliefs (if true) would be (albeit modest) 
evidence for the existence of God.
The second problem is that prima facie justification of the kind 
suggested by BB is rather weak, especially in a cultural context where 
alternative religious beliefs to one’s own (and even a  wide variety of 
non-religious worldviews) are readily available to all. So, without any 
independent reasons for one’s religious belief other than the basic, 
intuitive support of one’s own cognitive mechanisms, specific religious 
beliefs would be unlikely to survive for long. From the remarks that 
Barrett makes elsewhere in BB, we can infer that he believes that some 
such reasons could, nevertheless, be given and at least some types of 
religious beliefs might not be any worse off than most non-religious 
beliefs. However, the original point still stands: even if the BB account 
does not all by itself make religious beliefs unjustified, epistemically 
responsible religious (and non-religious) believers need to reflectively 
consider defeaters in order to maintain justified belief.
In conclusion, let me just say that a book that is as well written and 
concise as BB deserves a readership outside psychological circles. From 
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a philosophical point of view, it does not offer much, especially in terms 
of the problems relevant for philosophy of religion. But again, this might 
be too much to expect from a popular book such as BB. Fortunately, there 
is an emerging literature on philosophers engaging with psychological 
and biological explanations of religion (e.g., The Believing Primate, OUP 
2009). Further, Barrett himself has addressed the topic in several articles 
and his other 2012 book Cognitive Science, Religion and Theology: From 
Human Minds to Divine Minds (JTF Press), which I  would suggest as 
a companion piece to BB.
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In his excellent book Dialogues about God, Charles Taliaferro gives 
a comprehensive introduction into the main questions concerning the 
subject of God. The theist Taliaferro presents his introduction in the form 
of a dialogue, because he appreciates the abilities of self-questioning and 
of placing oneself into the opposing position (p. xii). He chose the form 
of a friendly dialogue in order to enable a constructive discussion and 
reduce the hostility which sometimes occurs in philosophical discussions 
(pp. xiii-xiv). The four characters of this dialogue are the secular naturalist 
Pat, the theist Chris, the agnostic Tony and the negative theologian Liz 
who holds that God is beyond human concepts (pp. xiv-xvi).
Is Theism coherent and valid as an Explanation?: Pat begins the dialogue 
by arguing that theism is incoherent. Theism assumes the existence of 
God, a conscious immaterial person. But we are only familiar with bodily 
beings. Without a face there can be no grin. Without a body there can 
be no thinking, feeling and acting. The idea of an immaterial person is 
incoherent (pp. 2-4). Chris objects to that and argues that human beings 
are conscious immaterial persons. Hence conscious immaterial persons 
are possible. Chris argues that materialism with respect to human beings 
is false. Beliefs, purposes and desires cannot be reduced to physical 
processes in the brain. We can imagine that human beings are zombies, 
i.e. that they behave as if they had mental life with conscious experiences 
while in fact lacking mental life altogether. This conceivability is 
